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Abstract—Recent years have seen rising needs for location-
based services in our everyday life. Aside from the many
advantages provided by these services, they have caused serious
concerns regarding the location privacy of users. An adver-
sary such as an untrusted location-based server can monitor
the queried locations by a user to infer critical information
such as the user’s home address, health conditions, shopping
habits, etc. To address this issue, dummy-based algorithms have
been developed to increase the anonymity of users, and thus,
protecting their privacy. Unfortunately, the existing algorithms
only consider a limited amount of side information known by an
adversary which may face more serious challenges in practice.
In this paper, we incorporate a new type of side information
based on consecutive location changes of users and propose a
new metric called transition-entropy to investigate the location
privacy preservation, followed by two algorithms to improve
the transition-entropy for a given dummy generation algorithm.
Then, we develop an attack model based on the Viterbi algorithm
which can significantly threaten the location privacy of the users.
Next, in order to protect the users from Viterbi attack, we
propose an algorithm called robust dummy generation (RDG)
which can resist against the Viterbi attack while maintaining
a high performance in terms of the privacy metrics introduced
in the paper. All the algorithms are applied and analyzed on a
real-life dataset.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ubiquitous use of smartphones and social networks,
location-based services (LBSs) have become an essential part
of the contemporary society. The users of smart devices
can simply download location-based applications and query
the information from the LBS provider. For example, LBSs
offered by companies like Alibaba, Apple, and Google can
be used to find nearby restaurants, track the parcels, and
provide personalized weather notifications. The annual market
for LBSs is expected to reach USD 77.84 Billion by 2021,
with an annual growth rate of 38.9% [1].
In spite of countless advantages of LBSs, the privacy issues
associated with the user locations have raised many concerns
in our society. An untrusted server can collect the location data
of users and analyze it to learn sensitive information such as
the type of queries submitted, shopping habits of users, and the
address of users’ properties or workplaces. Such information
can be easily abused by the server or disclosed to other parties.
Therefore, it is of great importance to devise new ways to
preserve the location privacy of users defined as ”the ability
to prevent other parties from learning one’s current or past
locations” [2].
The techniques to address the threats to the location privacy
of users have attracted much attention among researchers [2]–
[6]. Most of the literature is based on an approach called k-
anonymity [7]. Using this criterion, the release of a location is
said to provide k-anonymity, if the real location of any user is
not distinguishable from at least k−1 other locations. Initially,
the approach to hide the location of the user was conducted
using a trusted anonymization server [8], but later on, due
to the shortcomings of this approach such as the anonymizer
becoming the bottleneck itself, the use of dummy locations
to achieve the k-anonymity was proposed in [9]. Since then,
the researchers have strived to develop dummy generation
algorithms to preserve the k-anonymity for users.
The principal idea behind the dummy generation algorithms
is to generate k − 1 dummy locations aside from the real
location of the user and submitting them all together to the
LBS server while asking for a query from the LBS provider.
Thus, it makes it difficult for an untrusted LBS provider, or
so-called the adversary, to identify the real location of the user.
The groundwork in this field was laid by the authors in [9].
They generated the dummies randomly throughout the map
and evolved them as users move. Followed by this work, the
authors in [10] and [11] proposed to choose the candidate
dummies from a virtual circle or grid constructed around
the current location of the user. Unfortunately, in all of the
mentioned works, the fact that the adversary might have some
side information which can rule out the dummies or reveal the
real location of the user was overlooked.
One important piece of side information which can be
exploited by the adversary is the query probability of the lo-
cations across the map. The adversary can utilize the recorded
data and infer the number of times that the users have queried
over various locations on the map. Using this information, the
adversary can calculate the query probability of each location,
and then, identify the dummy locations according to the his-
tory of interests in locations. For instance, if a dummy has been
chosen on a lake, where the query probability is basically close
to zero, the adversary will then know with a high likelihood
that such queried location is a dummy. And therefore, such
naive selection of dummy locations compromises the location
privacy of the user. To solve this issue, an enhanced algorithm
was proposed by [12], referred to as the dummy-location
selection (DLS) algorithm. Basically speaking, the authors
used an entropy metric [13] to evaluate the queries submitted
in different locations and generated the dummies in a way to
maximize the entropy.
Although the DLS algorithm is promising for a stationary
set of the queried locations including the real location and
its associated dummies, the algorithm fails to address the
privacy issues caused by the consecutive queries made to the
LBS provider. In more detail, the authors have limited the
side information to queries submitted in different locations
but overlooked the fact the adversary has also access to the
trajectories, and consequently, the number of times the paths
between locations have been traveled. Having access to such
extra side information, the adversary can expose the dummies
and compromise the k-anonymity of the users. For further
explanation, a toy example has been provided in Fig. 1, where
Fig. 1: An example of location privacy of the user being compromised by
considering the introduced side information.
we show a user moving from location A to location B with
k set to two. The associated dummies of the real locations A
and B are denoted by A′ and B′, respectively. The dummies
in each location set are generated using the DLS algorithm,
hence, they have a similar probability of being selected. The
numbers on the directed edges indicate the number of times
that users have queried the end location of the edge right after
asking about the starting point of the edge. For instance, the
users have queried location B for 100 times immediately after
location A′. According to the DLS algorithm, the k-anonymity
requirement has been preserved for each location. However, let
us look at the four paths connecting the two sets of locations
together and consider the number of times that each path has
been inquired. It can be seen from Fig. 1 that location B
has been inquired for 320 times after locations A and A′
whereas location B′ has only received 110 times of inquiries.
Therefore, the adversary can infer with a high likelihood that
the real location is possibly location B, and thus, compromise
the location privacy of the user.
The main contributions of this paper follow.
• We quantify the currently existing metric and name it
cell-entropy and propose a new metric called transition
for two consecutive queries which considers the intro-
duced side information based on transitions of the users.
• We expand the transition-entropy metric for trajectories
followed by developing two algorithms which can be
applied on any of the existing dummy generation methods
to improve the transition entropy.
• We propose an attack model based on the Viterbi algo-
rithm and develop an algorithm to improve the resilience
against the attack while maintaining the high performance
in terms of cell-entropy and transition-entropy
• We analyze the performance of the proposed metrics and
algorithms on a real-life dataset.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start
by explaining the existing works in literature in Section II.
Section III describes the system model used throughout the
paper including the system architecture, the adversary model,
and the side information used by the adversary. In section
IV, we introduce our proposed metrics followed by explaining
the proposed attack model in section V. Next, the proposed
algorithms are illustrated in section VI. Finally, the analysis
of the proposed metrics and algorithms is provided in section
VII, and we conclude our work in section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Anonymity is defined as ”the state of being not identifiable
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set” [14]. Also, the
location of a user is said to be k-anonymous if it is not
distinguishable from at k − 1 other user locations [15]. To
obtain k-anonymity for users several approaches have been
proposed in which we have identified four broad categories:
location cloaking, mix-zones, pseudonyms, and dummy aided
algorithms.
The research on location cloaking was initiated by Gruteser
and Grunwald [16]. The key idea is to employ a trusted server
to aid the users preserve their k-anonymity. Upon receiving a
query from a user, the location anonymizer server computes a
cloaking box including the location of the user and k−1 other
user locations and queries the requested service from the LBS
provider for all the k locations. Therefore, making it difficult
for the LBS provider to identify the user [17], [18]. Several
algorithms have been proposed to implement location cloaking
scheme such as ICliqueCloak [19] and MaxAccuCloak [20].
The main drawback of the location cloaking is the need for a
location anonymizer which is an additional cost overhead to
the system. The location anonymizer can become a bottleneck
itself both from the privacy and computational complexity
perspective.
The authors in [21] proposed the idea of mixed zones.
Mixed zone is defined as the spatial zone where the identity
of users is not identifiable. All the users entering into a
mixed zone will change their pseudonym to a new unused
pseudonym making it difficult for the adversary to identify the
users. The anonymization process is performed by a middle-
ware mechanism before transferring the data to third-party
applications. The authors further extended their work in [22]
by considering irregular shapes for mix zones. Moreover,
the use of mix zones has particularly attracted attention in
vehicular communications. Applying the mix zones method
for road networks is considered in [23], [24], where a mixed
zone construction method called MobiMix is proposed. Lu et
al. [25] exploited the pseudonym changes to for mix- zones at
social spots and Gao et al. [26] applied mix zones approach
on trajectories for mobile crowd sensing applications. Further-
more, the use of cryptography for generation of mix zones in
vehicular communications is considered in [27]. As it is the
case for location cloaking approach, the main drawback of
mix zones is also the need for a middle-ware mechanism or a
trusted party before transferring the data to an untrusted LBS
provider.
Another technique to increase the location privacy of the
users is based on the assignment of pseudonyms to hide the
identity of the users. The identity of a user can be the name
of the person, a unique identifier such as IP address, or any
properties that can be related to the user. The authors in [28]
proposed a scenario so-called intermediary scenario in which
a trusted intermediary collects the location information of the
users such as GPS data and assigns a pseudonym before send-
ing them to a third party LBS provider which is considered
to be untrusted. The paper claims that the use of pseudonyms
prevents the third party LBS provider from identifying and
tracking the users. The work in [29] suggests that instead
of delegating the generation of pseudonyms to the location
intermediary, users generate the pseudonyms themselves. The
use of pseudonyms for preserving the location privacy has
also been considered in vehicular communication systems such
as the work in [30]. There are several drawbacks associated
with this approach. First of all, many of the location-based
applications require the users to subscribe in order to use the
offered services. Secondly, similar to the last two categories,
this approach also requires a trusted intermediary. And finally,
analyzing the patterns in location data an adversary can
compromise the identity of the users [31].
The last category which is considered to be a more promis-
ing approach since there is no need for a trusted anonymizer
as it was the case for the location cloaking, mix zones, and
pseudonyms is the use of dummy locations. This approach
was initially proposed in [9]. The principal idea is to achieve
k-anonymity by sending k − 1 dummy location aside from
the real location of the user while asking for an LBS from
an untrusted LBS provider. All the locations use the same
identifier corresponding to the user. Having dummy locations,
it would become difficult for the adversary to identify the real
location of the users. Several algorithms have been proposed
to help the users generate the dummies. The authors in [10]
proposed to use a virtual circle or a virtual grid which is based
on the real location of users to generate the dummies. The idea
was further developed in [11]. More recently, an algorithm
called dummy-location selection (DLS) was proposed in [12].
The algorithm takes the number of queries made in the map
into consideration and proves via simulations that previous
algorithms are susceptible if the adversary exploits this side in-
formation. Although the algorithm provides a great framework
for the generation of dummies, it does not take into account
that the users are in danger of losing their location privacy if
the adversary tracks them and access to other side information
such as the number of transitions made in the map. Do et
al. [32] utilized conditional probabilities to generate realistic
false locations and Hara et al. [33] proposed a method based
on physical constraints of the real environment.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Architecture
In this paper, we adopt a non-cooperative system architec-
ture [34], as shown in Fig. 2. In this architecture, the LBS
users are directly in contact with the LBS provider with no
middle-man or a third party service provider.
Fig. 2: Non-cooperative system architecture for LBSs.
Assume that the location map is divided into an n×n grid
and a user communicates with an LBS server for a service. At
time tq , the user intends to make his/her q-th query from the
service provider, preserving kq-anonymity. Here, kq quantifies
the privacy protection requirement of the user. This metric
implies that the adversary is not able to identify the real
location of the user with a probability higher than 1/kq. Hence,
such user needs to transmit kq− 1 dummy location to hide its
true location from the observer. Note that by the term location
we refer to the cell in which the user is located. We denote the
set of locations transmitted to the LBS provider at q-th query
by
LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq}. (1)
Also, the real location is shown by rq where rq ∈ LSq. The
probability of location lqx being the real location is shown by
Pr(lqx = r
q) for x = 1, ..., kq. (2)
In the next query, the user requires kq+1-anonymity and
queries the location set LSq+1 = {lq+11 , l
q+1
2 , ..., l
q+1
kq+1
} from
the LBS provider. The probability of lq+1y ∈ LS
q+1 being
queried consecutively after lqx ∈ LS
q is denoted by
Pr(lqx ⇒ l
q+1
y ). (3)
B. Adversary Model
Two types of adversary models are considered in our work:
an active adversary, and a passive adversary. The passive
adversary can listen to the communication between the users
and the LBS provider. Analyzing the collected information,
the passive adversary can compromise the location privacy of
the users by performing an eavesdropping attack. An active
adversary, on the other hand, compromises the LBS provider
and has access to the information stored on the server. In our
work, the active adversary is assumed to be the LBS provider
itself.
C. Side Infromation
The adversary is assumed to possess the location map of
the area where the users are distributed. He has access to the
queries made by the users and can record them over time
to obtain the history of the locations where the users have
queried from. Moreover, the adversary can calculate the query
probability of different locations in the map, which is defined
as the number of times a particular location has been queried.
The adversary can exploit the query probability to infer the
probability of a location being genuine or fake in the future
queries. For instance, if a user queries two location, one with
a comparably higher probability, it is more likely that the real
location has the higher probability.
Apart from the possession of traditional side information
by the adversary, we assume that the adversary has access
to the number of times each path has been traveled on the
map. The authorities do not provide any time limit for storing
the location information of the users, as it is the case in
the US [35]. This lack of legislation enables the adversary
to monitor the users and access to the trajectories traveled
by them. Therefore, the adversary not only has the data on
the number of queries made on each location, but it is well-
aware of the number of times that a location has been queried
consecutively after the other locations.
IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS OF PRIVACY
In this section, we briefly explain a metric which was
partially developed in [12]. Then, we propose a metric called
transition-entropy to analyze the privacy preservation in LBSs
for two consecutive queries followed by expanding the metric
for trajectories.
A. Cell-entropy Metric
Although not mentioned as a metric in [12], cell-entropy
was implicitly proposed as part of the DLS algorithm. We
have named this metric cell-entropy to distinguish it from the
transition-entropy metric proposed in this paper. For a given
location set LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq} which includes the real
location of a user and kq− 1 dummies chosen to preserve kq-
anonymity, the set of query probabilities are shown by Bq =
{bq1, b
q
2, ..., b
q
kq} where b
q
j is the query probability of location
(cell) lqj for j = 1...k
q. The query of probability of cell lqj is
calculated by
bqj =
number of queries in lqj
number of queries in whole map
. (4)
The cell-entropy borrows the concept of entropy from infor-
mation theory to quantify the uncertainty in query probability
of the locations in LSq. The cell-entropy metric for location
set LSq can be defined as [12]
h = −
kq∑
j=1
bqj log2 b
q
j . (5)
B. Transition-entropy
The main purpose of the metric we propose here is to
provide a benchmark for the comparison between dummy-
based algorithms taking into account the comprehensive side
information we consider in this paper. The metric indicates
the susceptibility of the existing algorithms to attacks on
location privacy of the users as the k-anonymity requirement
of the users can easily be compromised in trajectories. Hence,
necessitating the need for the development of new algorithms
for preserving the location privacy of the users. We start by
illustrating the metric for two consecutive queries and then
generalizing it for trajectories.
1) Transition-entropy metric for two consecutive queries:
Assume that at time tq a user makes its q-th query and has an
anonymity constraint of kq , and requests the service for the
location set of LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq}. The set LS
q includes
kq − 1 dummies and the real location of user. Then, at time
tq+1 the user moves to a new location with the anonymity
constraint of kq+1 and makes his (q+1)-th query providing the
server with the location set of LSq+1 = {lq+11 , l
q+1
2 , ..., l
q+1
kq+1
}
consisting of the real location of the user and the associated
dummies. The dummies can be generated using any of the
existing algorithms.
Using the sets LSq and LSq+1, we generate a bipartite
graph shown in Fig. 3, where each set forms the vertices at a
side of the graph. We denote the number of times the location
Fig. 3: The bipartite graph generated by the consecutive queries of a user.
lq+1y ∈ LS
q+1 follows the location lqx ∈ LS
q by nxy and
assign it to the directed edge connecting lqx to l
q+1
y . Also, for
every location lqx ∈ LS
q, we denote query probability of the
location lqx by b
q
x. The query probability of a cell is calculated
by dividing the number of times that cell has been called over
the whole number of queries of the map. This data is calculated
from the history of data LBS provider holds.
We would like to find out how probable it is for each
member of the location set LSq+1 to be the real location of the
user (rq+1) given the location set LSq in the previous query
from the LBS provider. In other words, the aim is to calculate
the posterior probability of the members in LSq+1 with respect
to LSq. This probability for each member of LSq+1 can be
calculated based on the LSq as
∀ lq+1y ∈ LS
q+1 :
Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|LSq) = (6)
kq∑
s=1
Pr((lqs ⇒ l
q+1
y ), (l
q
s = r
q)) = (7)
kq∑
s=1
Pr(lqs ⇒ l
q+1
y |l
q
s = r
q)Pr(lqs = r
q), (8)
where the equation (7) is the joint probability of lqs being the
real location of LSq and moving to the location lq+1y after l
q
s .
The former probability in equation (8) can be calculated as
∀ lq+1y ∈LS
q+1, ∀ lqx ∈ LS
q :
Pr(lqx ⇒ l
q+1
y |l
q
x = r
q) =
nxy
∑kq+1
y=1 nxy
, (9)
and the latter probability which indicates the normalized query
probability as
∀ lqx ∈ LS
q : Pr(lqx = r
q) =
bqx∑kq
j=1 b
q
j
. (10)
Note that equation (10) indicates that the posterior probability
of the cells in LSq are set to the normalized query probability
of the locations. Calculating equation (8) for every member
of the location set LSq+1, the posterior probabilities of the
locations in LSq+1 are derived based on the LSq. Having
these probabilities, we exploit the concept of entropy to infer
the uncertainty in identifying the dummies or the real location
of the users calculated by
h = −
kq+1∑
y=1
Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|LSq) log2 Pr(l
q+1
y = r
q+1|LSq).
(11)
We call h, the transition-entropy of the location set LSq+1
with respect to LSq. The transition-entropy metric represents
the uncertainty of identifying the real location by the adversary
in consecutive queries from the LBS provider. Having a larger
value for the transition-entropy indicates that for each member
of LSq+1, the probability of the paths originating from the
LSq to the destination of that member is similar to the other
members of LSq+1. Hence, it would be more difficult for
the adversary to compromise the kq+1-anonymity of the users
based on the transitions made from their previous query.
The formal algorithm for calculating the transition-entropy
of the location set LSq+1 with respect to LSq is presented
Algorithm 1: Calculation of transition-entropy for the
location set LSq+1 with respect to LSq.
1 Input: The location sets LSq and LSq+1.
2 Output: The transition-entropy of LSq+1 with respect to
LSq.
3 Initialization: CellSum = 0, h = 0.
4 for 1 ≤ x ≤ kq do
5 EdgeSum = 0
6 for 1 ≤ y ≤ kq+1 do
7 EdgeSum = EdgeSum+ nxy
8 end
9 for 1 ≤ y ≤ kq+1 do
10 Pr(lqx ⇒ l
q+1
y |l
q
x = r
q) = nxy/EdgeSum
11 end
12 end
13 for 1 ≤ x ≤ kq do
14 CellSum = CellSum+ bqx
15 end
16 for 1 ≤ x ≤ kq do
17 Pr(lqx = r
q) = bqx/CellSum
18 end
19 for 1 ≤ y ≤ kq+1 do
20 Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|LSq) = 0
21 for 1 ≤ x ≤ kq do
22 Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|LSq) = Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|LSq)
23 +Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|lqx = r
q)Pr(lqx = r
q)
24 end
25 h = h−
26 Pr(lq+1y = r
q+1|LSq) log2(Pr(l
q+1
y = r
q+1|LSq))
27 end
28 return h
in algorithm 1. The main advantages of the metric can be
mentioned as: (i) considering the performance of the dummy-
based algorithms in trajectories and not just a stationary set
of locations; (ii) being able to investigate the performance
of the dummy-based algorithms for users with varying k-
anonymity requirements in their trajectory; (iii) entailing many
other factors such as time reachability or direction similarity
considered in other works.
2) Transition-entropy metric for trajectories: In this sub-
section, we generalize the transition metric for trajectories with
different lengths. Assume that at time tq+c the user makes its
(c+1)-th query providing the LBS provider with the location
set LSq+c = {lq+c1 , l
q+c
2 , ..., l
q+c
kq+c
} with privacy requirement
of kq+c. The previous queried location sets are shown by
kq+i for i = 0, ..., c − 1 each with the privacy requirement
of kq+i and being queried at time tq+i. Initially, our aim
is to calculate the posterior probability of each location in
LSq+c. The posterior probabilities indicate the likelihood of
any location in LSq+c being the real location of the user
based on the previous queries that the user has made. Posterior
probability for each location in LSq+c can be written as
kq+c−1∑
sc=1
kq+c−2∑
sc−1=1
...
kq∑
s1=1
(Pr(lq
s1
= rq)Pr(lq+c−1sc ⇒ l
q+c
y |l
q+c−1
sc = r
q+c−1)
c−1∏
i=1
Pr(lq+i−1
si
⇒ lq+i+1q+i |l
q+i−1
si
= rq+i−1)) (15)
Algorithm 2: Calculation of transition-entropy for trajec-
tories of length c+ 1.
1 Input: The location sets LSq, LSq+1..., LSq+c.
2 Output: The TransitionEntropy of LSq+c with respect to
LSq, LSq+1..., LSq+c−1.
3 Initialization: TransitionEntropy = 0.
4 Run Algo. 1 for LSq and LSq+1
5 for q + 1 ≤ query ≤ q + c− 1 do
6 Normalize posterior probabilities of LSquery
7 Query probabilities of LSquery ← posterior
probabilities of LSquery
8 Run Algo. 1 for LSquery and LSquery+1
9 end
10 Normalize posterior probabilities of LSq+c
11 TransitionEntropy ← calculate Entropy
12 return TransitionEntropy
∀ lq+cy ∈ LS
q+c : Pr(lq+cy = r
q+c|LSq, ..., LSq+c−1) =
(12)
kq+c−1∑
sc=1
Pr((lq+c−1sc ⇒ l
q+c
y ),
(lq+c−1sc = r
q+c−1)|LSq, ..., LSq+c−2)) = (13)
kq+c−1∑
sc=1
Pr(lq+c−1sc ⇒ l
q+c
y |l
q+c−1
sc = r
q+c−1)×
Pr(lq+c−1sc = r
q+c−1|LSq, ..., LSq+c−2). (14)
Following the same process of moving from equa-
tion (12) to equation (14), the probability of Pr(lq+c−1
sc−1
=
rq+c−1|LSq, ..., LSq+c−2) can be solved recursively to reach
the equation (15) where the transition probabilities can be
calculated similar to the equation (9). Therefore, evaluating
this equation for each node in LSq+c we can realize the
likelihood of a location being the real location of the queried
set LSq+c. Finally, we borrow the concept of entropy to
understand the uncertainty in the data calculated as
h = −
kq+c∑
y=1
Pr(lq+cy = r
q+c|LSq, ..., LSq+c−1)
log2 Pr(l
q+c
y = r
q+c|LSq, ..., LSq+c−1).
(16)
We call h, the transition-entropy of the set LSq+c with respect
to the previous c queried location sets LSq, ..., LSq+c−1. As
it will be demonstrated in simulation results, the proposed
transition-entropy metric will indicate the susceptibility of the
locations in LSq+c to be identified as dummies or real location
of the user based on previous the queried location sets of the
trajectory. The algorithm to calculate the transition-entropy
metric is formally presented in Algo. 4.
Calculation of transition-entropy is only based on the query
probability of initial location set LSq and the transition
entropies throughout the trajectory. It is important to under-
stand why the query probability of the other locations on
the trajectory are not considered in the calculation of the
transition-entropy metric. This can best be understood by an
example. Fig. 4 demonstrates a user requesting a LBS in
two consecutive queries. The numbers written on the nodes
indicate the normalized query probability of the locations and
the numbers written on the edges indicate the normalized
probability of that transition. Assume we want to calculate
the transition-entropy metric for LSq+1 based on the previous
queried location set LSq. The purpose of the example is
to illustrate why the posterior probabilities calculated by the
previous queries for LSq+1 is more reliable than the query
probability of the locations in LSq+1. First, let us calculate the
posterior probabilities of LSq+1 and its entropy. The posterior
probabilities according to the equation (15) can be written as
Posterior probability of A being the true location = (17)
3
5
×
1
3
+
1
5
×
1
4
+
1
5
×
1
4
=
6
20
(18)
Posterior probability of B being the true location = (19)
3
5
×
1
3
+
1
5
×
2
4
+
1
5
×
3
4
=
9
20
(20)
Posterior probability of C being the true location = (21)
3
5
×
1
3
+
1
5
×
1
4
=
5
20
(22)
According to the query probabilities of LSq+1 the location
A is more likely to be the real location as it has a signifi-
cantly higher query probability, but looking at the posterior
probabilities calculated for the location set we can see that
based on LSq, location B is more probable to be the real
location of the user. This discrepancy can be explained by
looking at what the actual meaning of query probability is. The
query probability indicates the number of times a location has
been called but does not specify if it is been called after any
particular location. Therefore, although location A has been
called more times than the other locations in LSq+1, most
of these queries perhaps have been made consecutively after
locations E and D which are not a member of the location
set LSq. Hence, it can be seen that the posterior probabilities
are more credible as they are considering the number of times
queries made after prior location set LSq.
Fig. 4: An example of two consecutive queried location sets.
V. VITERBI ATTACK
The Viterbi algorithm is a well-known dynamic program-
ming algorithm proposed in 1967 by the authors in [36].
Initially, it was used for convolutional codes, but then it
found numerous applications such as exploring the most
likely sequence of hidden states in Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs). For a given graph, the aim of the algorithm is
to find the shortest path or so-called the most likely path.
The most likely path is usually referred to as the Viterbi
path. The Viterbi algorithm provides several features which
distinguishes this algorithm from others existing algorithms
for this purpose. The most important characteristic of the
algorithm can be mentioned as low computational complexity.
Here, we design an attack based on the Viterbi algorithm
and name it Viterbi attack since the principal idea behind
the attack is inspired by the Viterbi algorithm. The proposed
Viterbi attack can significantly endanger the location privacy
of the users if it is not considered in the design of the dummy
generation algorithms. The adversary can exploit the accessed
side information such as transition probabilities to compromise
the location privacy of the users by conducting Viterbi attack.
As it will be demonstrated in simulations, for a user traveling
an even short trajectory the Viterbi attack can successfully
identify many of the real location. In the following, We adopt
and explain how the Viterbi algorithm can be considered as a
threat to the location privacy of users.
Given the queried location sets LSq, LSq+1,...,LSq+c cor-
responding to a trajectory of length c + 1 of a user, an
attacker seeks to find the most probable state sequence to
compromise the location privacy of the user. Here lji ∈ LS
j
is referred to as a state of the location set LSj . The desired
state sequence of the adversary would be (rq, rq+1, ..., rq+c)
Algorithm 3: The algorithm of the proposed Viterbi attack.
1 Input: queried location sets LSq, LSq+1,...,LSq+c and
the normalized query probability for the location set
LSq
2 Initialization: .
3 for 1 ≤ u ≤ kq do
4 µ(0, u) = Pr(lqu = r
q)
5 pointer(0, u) = 0
6 end
7 for 1 ≤ j ≤ c do
8 for 1 ≤ u ≤ kq+j do
9 µ(j, u) = max
u′∈LSq+j−1
µ(j − 1, u′)Pr(u′ → u)
10 pointer(j, u)← state of max
u′∈LSq+j−1
µ(j − 1, u′)
11 end
12 end
13 EstState[c] = state of max(µ(c, :))
14 for c− 1 ≥ j ≥ 0 do
15 EstState[j] = pointer(j + 1, EstState[j + 1])
16 end
17 Output: EstState.
where for j = q to q + c, rj refers to the true location of the
queried set LSj . We define µ(m + 1, u) to be the maximum
probability of a state sequence with the length ofm+1 given as
zq, zq+1, ..., zq+m where zj ∈ LSj and zq+m = u ∈ LSq+m.
This function can be expressed mathematically as
µ(m+ 1, u) = max
zq:q+m |zq+m=u
Pr(zq+m = rq+m), (23)
where for each u ∈ LSq the initial value of the µ function is
set to
µ(0, u) = Pr(u = rq), (24)
in which as the most credible information for the first queried
location set is the query probability, Pr(u = rq) is calculated
via equation (10). Starting from the second queried location
set the most probable path can be calculated recursively as
µ(m+ 1, u) = max
u′∈LSq+m−1
µ(m,u′)Pr(u′ → u). (25)
The formal presentation of Viterbi attack is given in the
Algo. 3. The algorithm starts by setting the initial values of
the µ array to their normalized query probability in lines 3−6.
An array called pointer is used to keep track of the most likely
state of the previous queried location set as the most probable
path is calculated in lines 7 − 12. Finally, the most probable
path is chosen and the corresponding states are returned as
output.
VI. THE PROPOSED ALGORITHMS TO IMPROVE LOCATION
PRIVACY OF USERS
In this section, we start by proposing two algorithms for
improving the transition-entropy metric. The algorithms are
independent of the method used for generating the dum-
Algorithm 4: The proposed exhaustive search algorithm
for location privacy preservation of the users.
1 Input: kq+1, the location set LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq} in
q-th query, and the location set LSq+1 = {lq+11 } which
only includes the real location of the user at (q + 1)-th
query.
2 Output: the location set LSq+1 which includes the real
location and (kq+1 − 1) dummies.
3 Initialization: .
4 D ← generate a pool of 4kq+1 dummies using the DLS
algorithm
5 {S1, S2, ...Sm} ← choose m distinct (k
q+1 − 1)-subsets
of D
6 for 1 ≤ y ≤ m do
7 Sy ← Sy ∪ {l
q+1
1 }
8 hy ← calculate transition-entropy of Sy
9 H ← H ∪ {hy}
10 end
11 for 1 ≤ y ≤ m do
12 if hy is the maximum number in H then
13 return Sy
14 exit;
15 end
16 end
mies. For the purpose of explanation, the underlying dummy
generation algorithm is set to DLS in our work. The first
proposed algorithm is based on exhaustively searching for
the desired dummy set and the second algorithm follows a
greedy approach for selection of the dummies. We continue
by proposing an algorithm called robust dummy generation
(RDG) which can significantly increase the privacy of the
users against the Viterbi attack while maintaining the high
performance in terms of transition-entropy and cell-entropy.
A. Exhaustive Search Algorithm
Suppose that at time tq the user has made its q-th query
for the location set of LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq} which includes
the real location and its associated dummies. As the user
changes its location and makes his (q + 1)-th query at time
tq+1, assuming kq+1-anonymity for the user, we wish to
generate the location set LSq+1 = {lq+11 , l
q+1
2 , ..., l
q+1
kq+1
} to
maximize the transition-entropy metric. The idea is to generate
a pool of dummies instead of only kq+1 − 1 fake locations
which have similar cell-entropy to the real location of the
user and choosing kq+1 − 1 subsets of the dummy location
pool for evaluation of their transition-entropy performance.
The formal description of the proposed method for generating
the dummies of the set LSq+1 is explained in the Algorithm 4.
The procedure starts by generating a pool of 4kq+1 dummies
using the DLS algorithm and assigning them to set D. Then,
m distinct subsets of D are chosen each with (kq+1 − 1)
members, which will form a complete kq+1 set of locations
by addition of the real location (lq+11 ). Finally, the transition-
Algorithm 5: The proposed greedy algorithm for location
privacy preservation of the users.
1 Input: kq+1, the location set LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq} in
q-th query, and the location set LSq+1 = {lq+11 } which
only includes the real location of the user at (q + 1)-th
query.
2 Output: the location set LSq+1 which includes the real
location and (kq+1 − 1) dummies.
3 Initialization: .
4 D ← generate a pool of 4kq+1 dummies using the DLS
algorithm
5 for 1 ≤ member ≤ kq+1 − 1 do
6 entropy = zeros(1× |D|)
7 for 1 ≤ d ≤ |D| do
8 LSq+1 = LSq+1 ∪ {Dd}
9 entropy[d]←
transition entropy of LSq+1 w.r.t. LSq
10 LSq+1 = LSq+1 − {Dd}
11 end
12 NewMember←
{member of D which maximize entropy}
LSq+1 = LSq+1 ∪ {NewMember}
13 D = D − {NewMember}
14 end
15 return LSq+1
entropy of each set is calculated with respect to LSq, and the
set with the maximum transition-entropy is returned as the
(q + 1)-th query set.
The proposed exhaustive search algorithm considers the
extra side information incorporated in this paper. As it will
be demonstrated in simulation results, the algorithm provides
a significantly better transition-entropy performance compared
to the existing algorithms while maintaining the traditional
cell-entropy metric near optimal.
B. Greedy Algorithm
Although the Exhaustive search algorithm can significantly
improve the location privacy of the users, the high compu-
tational overhead is a major drawback of the algorithm. The
computational cost of the exhaustive search algorithm is in
the order of O(mk2) where if no bound is selected for m,
its value is C4kk . It can be seen that the implementation of
such algorithm can be time-consuming. Therefore, in order
to decrease the computation complexity, we propose a greedy
approach which can achieve an order of O(k3).
Following the same setup explained in exhaustive search
algorithm we aim to generate the set LSq+1 in a way to
maximize the transition-entropy with respect to the previous
location set LSq. The principal idea behind the greedy algo-
rithm is to choose the members which maximize the transition-
entropy one by one and add them to the LSq+1 instead of
looking at all the possible combinations and the transition-
entropy they achieve. The algorithm starts by generating a pool
of dummies using the DLS algorithm. The DLS algorithm
has been chosen due to its robust performance in terms of
cell-entropy, the algorithm is applicable for other dummy
generation methods as well. Initially, the location set LSq+1
only includes the real location of the user at (q+1)-th query.
The next member is added by trying out all the members in
D and calculating the transition-entropy of LSq+1 including
that member and choosing the one which maximizes the
transition-entropy. Then, we move to the third member and
the same procedure is repeated until all the kq+1−1 dummies
are chosen. The greedy algorithm is formally presented in
Algorithm 5.
C. RDG Algorithm
In this subsection, we propose RDG algorithm in which the
aim is to increase the resilience against the Viterbi attack while
maintaining the cell-entropy and transition-entropy as high as
the currently existing algorithms.
The algorithm is based on the idea of posterior probabilities
introduced as part of the derivation of the transition-entropy.
We explain the algorithm for generation of LSq+1 from the
queried location set LSq. If LSq is the initial query of the user
from the LBS provider, then, the initial posterior probabilities
are set to the normalized query probability of the locations
in LSq; otherwise, the posterior probabilities are calculated
from equation (12). In the algorithm, posterior probabilities
are assigned to an array called weight.
The algorithm starts by the generation of a pool of dummies
using the DLS algorithms based on the real location of LSq+1.
Using DLS algorithm to generate the pool of dummies will
ensure the high performance of the algorithm in terms of
the cell-entropy. From our experiments, setting the pool size
to four times of the kq+1 would still keep the cell-entropy
quite high while resulting a robust performance in terms of
the transition-entropy and Viterbi attack resilience. Next, the
algorithm continues by employing a greedy approach to add
the most suitable dummies for the location set LSq+1. For
choosing the i-th member of the set LSq+1, each of the
remaining dummies in the pool is checked one by one. A
criterion chosen here is based on maximizing the entropy for
the array weight. For each member u ∈ LSq+1, the weight
array is calculated as
weight(2, u) = max
u′∈LSq
weight(1, u′)Pr(u′ → u). (26)
The weight array is chosen to be a two-dimensional array
to distinguish between the weights for different location sets.
For each member of the dummy pool, its weight is calculated
followed by the entropy of the weight array. After calculation
of the entropy for all the possible members, the member which
results in maximum entropy is chosen as a next member of
LSq+1. The process continues until all the kq+1− 1 dummies
of LSq+1 are chosen. Note that before calculation of the
entropy the weights are normalized to make the accumulation
of the probabilities add up to one. The algorithm has been
designed to provide a high cell-entropy and transition-entropy
Algorithm 6: The proposed greedy algorithm for location
privacy preservation of the users.
1 Input: kq+1, the location set LSq = {lq1, l
q
2, ..., l
q
kq} in
q-th query, and the location set LSq+1 = {lq+11 } which
only includes the real location of the user at (q + 1)-th
query.
2 Output: the location set LSq+1 which includes the real
location and (kq+1 − 1) dummies.
3 Initialization: .
4 for 1 ≤ u ≤ kq do
5 weight(1, u)← Posterior probability of lqu
6 end
7 D ← generate a pool of 4kq+1 dummies using the DLS
algorithm
8 for 1 ≤ member ≤ kq+1 − 1 do
9 entropy = zeros(1× |D|)
10 for 1 ≤ d ≤ |D| do
11 LSq+1 = LSq+1 ∪ {Dd}
12 for 1 ≤ u ≤ kq+1 do
13 weight(2, u) = max
u′∈LSq
weight(1, u′)Pr(u′ →
u)
14 end
15 normalize weight(2, :)
16 entropy[d]← entropy of weight(2, :)
17 LSq+1 = LSq+1 − {Dd}
18 end
19 NewMember←
{member of D which maximize entropy}
LSq+1 = LSq+1 ∪ {NewMember}
20 D = D − {NewMember}
21 end
22 return LSq+1
privacy for the users while protecting them from the Viterbi
attack on trajectories.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
In our experiment, we use the data collected by Geolife
project [37]–[39], which includes the GPS trajectories of 182
users from April 2007 to August 2012 in Beijing, China. The
dataset contains the GPS logs of the users including 17, 621
trajectories with a total distance of 1, 292, 951km. There are
two main advantages distinguishing Geolife dataset for our
work. Firstly, the recorded data aside from monitoring the
daily routines of the users, such as going to work or home,
includes trajectories involving the sports activities like hiking
and cycling. Secondly, many of the recorded trajectories are
tagged with a transportation mode, which indicates the use of
various means of traveling from bus and car to airplane and
train.
We have conducted our experiments on 1km×1km central
part of the Beijing map with the resolution of 0.01km ×
0.01km for each grid cell. The location privacy requirement
Fig. 5: Comparison of algorithms in terms of cell-entropy for different values
of k.
(k) of the users are investigated for the values 2 to 30. For
each value of k, the algorithms are repeated 3000 time to
ensure the reliability of the results. Although the proposed
algorithm and metric can be used for the users who have
varying location privacy requirements in consecutive queries
of the LBS, for the sake of comparison, we have assumed that
the k value stays the same in consecutive calls for the LBS.
Additionally, the experiments are performed on a PC with a
3.40GHz core-i7 Intel processor, 64-bit Windows 7 operating
system, and 8.00GB of RAM. Moreover, Python program is
used to implement the algorithms.
B. Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithms and metrics through an extensive number of exper-
iments. The desired outcome of the experiments is to show
that the proposed RDG algorithm can withhold the currently
established metric of cell-entropy [12] while increasing the
performance in terms of the proposed metric transition-entropy
and providing the users with a high privacy preservation
against the developed Viterbi attack. We start by analyzing
the performance of the algorithms in terms of cell-entropy,
followed by transition-entropy analysis and investigating their
performance against Viterbi attack.
1) Cell-entropy performance evaluation: In order to calcu-
late the cell-entropy metric, the adversary records the number
of times each cell has been queried over time, and using
this information calculates the query probability of each cell.
Once the dataset including the real location and dummies
are submitted to the server, the adversary can calculate the
cell-entropy of the user. A higher value for the cell-entropy
indicates more uncertainty in finding the real location or
recognizing the dummies. Therefore, maximum cell-entropy
is desirable to maintain the k-anonymity of the users.
Fig. 5 represents the comparison of different algorithms in
terms of cell-entropy. The optimal value is achieved when the
k locations queried form the LBS provider all have the same
Fig. 6: Comparison of algorithms in terms of transition-entropy for different
values of k in trajectory of length 2.
probability of
1
k
, or equivalently, the location set has the cell-
entropy of h = log2 k. The optimal value is the target for all
the algorithms since it is the maximum entropy that a location
set can achieve. In the random scheme [9], the dummies are
generated randomly which expectedly results in a lower cell-
entropy compared to the other algorithms. As it can be seen
in the figure, the DLS algorithm achieves near-optimal perfor-
mance in terms of the cell-entropy. Therefore, the adversary is
unable to compromise the k-anonymity of the user from the
stationary set of locations submitted to the server using the
available query probabilities. The exhaustive, greedy and RDG
algorithms can also achieve near-optimal performance which
indicates that in all the algorithms the adversary is unable to
identify the dummy location by exploiting the cell-entropy.
It must be noted that proposed algorithms here is adaptable
to any dummy generation algorithm, therefore, the reason for
a high cell-entropy performance of the proposed algorithms
is that we have chosen DLS as our base. Hence, if other
algorithms are chosen, the cell-entropy performance must be
evaluated for them as well to ensure the robust performance
in terms of the cell-entropy.
2) Transition-entropy performance evaluation: The cur-
rently established cell-entropy metric only considers the lo-
cation privacy for the stationary set of queried locations
submitted to the LBS server, but overlooks the fact that the
adversary has access to the trajectories traveled by the users
as well. The adversary can use the likelihood of traveling
different paths between the consecutive location sets, and
infer with a high probability that many of the submitted
locations are dummies, which leads to failure in preserving
location privacy requirements of the users. Fig. 6 compares the
performance of different algorithms in terms of the transition-
entropy for a path length of two. For all the algorithms, based
on the value of k, two consecutive location sets are generated,
each including the real location and its associated dummies. To
make the experiments as realistic as possible, the real location
Fig. 7: Comparison of algorithms in terms of transition-entropy for different
values of k in trajectories of length 2, 3 and 4.
movements are chosen randomly from the recorded trajectories
in the dataset.
The optimal value in Fig. 6 corresponds to a scenario in
which all the members of the second location set are equally
likely to be called consecutively after the members of the first
location set. The optimal values can be calculated in a similar
way as the optimal number for the cell-entropy for different
values of k. As it can be seen from the figure, the random
scheme has a very poor performance which means that the
adversary can easily recognize most of the dummies from the
transition-entropy even for the two consecutive location sets
queried by the user. The first point to notice in the figure is that
although DLS algorithm achieved a near-optimal performance
in terms of cell-entropy, transition-entropy performance indi-
cates that the adversary can compromise the location privacy
of the users by calculating the posterior probabilities. The
transition-entropy of the proposed algorithms in this paper can
be seen to significantly improve the transition-entropy perfor-
mance, almost improving the performance more than twice
as high as the DLS algorithm. In other words, the likelihood
of compromising the k-anonymity requirement is decreased
by the proposed algorithms which leads to a higher location
privacy for the users of LBSs. The exhaustive algorithm can
be seen to achieve a little worse performance compared to the
RDG and greedy. This lower performance is due to setting
an upper bound for the number of sets chosen for calculation
of the transition-entropy instead of going through them all
which will become highly computational when the pool size
of dummies is large. The performance of RDG can be seen to
significantly high compared to the other algorithms.
Fig. 7, extends our analysis of transition-entropy for trajec-
tories with higher length. The crucial inference from the graph
is that as more number of locations are queried from the LBS
provider, the transition-entropy reduces. This simulation result
corresponds to the theoretical analysis that by having more
information the adversary is able to calculate the posterior
Fig. 8: The performance evaluation of DLS, greedy, and RDG algorithms
against Viterbi attack considering various path lengths and privacy requirement
k
probabilities more accurately which results in less uncertainty
for the adversary to identify the real location of the users.
The previous algorithm DLS can be seen to have a very
low transition-entropy compared to the proposed algorithms
greedy and DLS. Therefore, our proposed algorithms are
viable in increasing the transition-entropy of the users while
maintaining the cell-entropy to near-optimal performance. It
must be noted that the greedy and RDG are able to increase the
transition-entropy for different dummy generation algorithms
without depending on what the underlying algorithm for the
generation of the pool of dummies is. Therefore, a better
algorithm than DLS algorithm can cause the performance to
improve as the greedy and RDG algorithms increased the
transition-entropy of DLS algorithm.
C. Performance of Algorithms Against Viterbi Attack
In this subsection, we analyze the performance of our
proposed algorithms against the designed Viterbi attack. The
performance analysis is given in Fig. 8. Considering the
extensive side information we incorporated in this paper, the
Viterbi attack would be a significantly threatening privacy
issue for the users of LBSs. Looking at the percentage of real
locations protected in the Viterbi attack on DLS algorithm, it
can be seen that, for instance, in a trajectory of length 8 the
adversary is able to identify almost all the real locations of the
users. This shows that although in a single request of LBS from
the server the locations are protected using existing dummy
generation algorithms, in trajectories the side information that
the adversary has, can cause the compromised LBS provider to
almost identify all the real locations. The apparent trend for all
the path lengths is that increasing the number of dummies can
improve the preservation of location privacy, but this increase
is not sufficient even for trajectories of length two.
The second algorithm considered in Fig 8 is the greedy
algorithm proposed in our work to increase the transition-
entropy of the dummy generation algorithms. Although the
algorithm prevents the inference of real locations based on
transition-entropy, it is not capable of providing location
privacy against the Viterbi attack conducted by the adversary.
The performance of greedy algorithm against Viterbi attack
gets worse as more number of queries are made from the LBS
as the adversary will have more accurate information from the
history of data. On the other hand, looking at the performance
analysis of RDG, it can be seen that as the algorithm tends to
confuse the adversary more and more in each requested query
from the LBS provider, having larger trajectories the difference
between the real path and estimated path of the Viterbi attack
becomes larger. RDG algorithm is able to protect at least
50 percent of the user queried locations if the k-anonymity
criterion is set to 15 or larger.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we incorporated new side information which
can be exploited by the adversary to compromise the location
privacy of the users. We proposed a metric called transition-
entropy to evaluate the performance of the dummy-based
algorithms and quantified the currently existing metric cell-
entropy. The metric is based on the transitions between the
locations in the map and considers the deplorable effect of new
side information on location privacy of the users. To improve
the transition-entropy metric two general approaches were
proposed to increase the transition-entropy for a given dummy
generation algorithm. Furthermore, we developed an attack
model based on the Viterbi algorithm on location privacy of
the users, followed by proposing an algorithm called RDG
to increase the performance in terms of the cell-entropy and
transition-entropy while protecting the users against Viterbi
attack. Finally, numerous experiments were performed on real-
world data to analyze the performance of the algorithms.
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